Managing technology transfer in the Korean military establishment. by Hong, Dae Sun
MANAGING TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER












Thesis Advisor J. W. Creighton









2. 80VT ACCESSION NO I. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBE»
« TITLE f«nd Submit)
Managing Technology Transfer in the
Korean Military Establishment
S TYPE OF REPOPIT a PERIOO COVERED
Master ' s Thesis
;
December 1979
t. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT huHltH
7 »uTHO»fi| i CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMIEVlJ
Dae Sun Hong
• PERFORMING OROANI Z ATION NAME ANO ADDRESS
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
10. program Element pkojEC* *»s<
area a work unit numbers





I J NUMBER OF PAGES
119




l« DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (ol Ihlm Mooortl
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.
17 DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (ol Ih* mbtirmct ailmd In Block 30, // dlttmronl tram Hoaort)
li. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
I* KEY WORDS (Continue on rmnrmb mid* ll nocomtmry and Idonllty by bloc* number)
Economic Development
Military Self-sufficiency
Self-reliance in national defense
Technology Transfer
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on rmvormo ttdm It nocomemry end identity by block number)
The Korean economy has grown successfully during the
past several decades. Korean armed forces are struggling to
achieve self-reliance as soon as possible.
Both the economy and defense need advanced technology to
maintain their rate of growth and to accomplish the country's
utmost goal, self-sufficiency.
By examining the historical background of the Korean economy
and national defense, the author's intent is to find causes and
DD ,:°r7J 1473
(Page 1)
COITION OF 1 MOV «1 IS OBSOLETE
S/N 102-0 14- 6«0 1 Unclassified
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAOE (Vnen Dolt Sntered)

Unclassified
t»CuWT» CL >I|I"C TlOM 0» Tmi» »«Olr«v w
problems of past growth and also to define new relationships
between the economy and national defense.
Finally, this thesis focuses on the role of defense
authority to lead in the utilization of technology rather







014-6601 Unci assi f igditcu'i'v cu*»ai/ie*Tioi» 0' t*i* ^cer***- o«'» »«<•»•<>

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
Managing Technology Transfer
in the Korean Military Establishment
by
Dae Sun Hong
Lieutenant Colonel, Republic of Korea Marine Corp:
B.S. Republic of Korea Naval Academy, 19 5 5
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree cf






The Korean economy has grown successfully during the
past several decades. Korean armed forces are struggling to
achieve self-reliance as soon as possible.
Both the economy and defense need advanced technology
to maintain their rate of growth and to accomplish the country's
utmost goal, self-sufficiency.
By examining the historical background of the Korean
economy and national defense, the author's intent is to find
causes and problems of past growth and also to define new
relationships between the economy and national defense.
Finally, this thesis focuses on the role of defense
authority to lead in the utilization of technology rather
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I . INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY
Korea, one of the poorest countries in the world until
early in the 1960 's, has maintained a continuous growth in
economy and defense power.
From a position uncomfortably close to the bottom of the
international income scale and without the benefit of signifi-
cant natural resources, Korea embarked on a course of industri
al growth that became one of the outstanding success stories
in international development [Ref. 1].
The Christian Science Monitor, in the last of a series
of articles concerning tomorrow's big powers, speculates that
Korea and the other developing countries, Brazil, Mexico,
Taiwan, Vietnam, Nigeria, Turkey and Iraq, may emerge as
future world powers, based on their economic potential and
military strength [Ref. 2],
International economic situations and the international
environment in the Korean peninsula will not necessarily be
favorable to the future of Korea. To overcome anticipated
difficulties, Korea badly needs the support of science and
technology in both economic and military areas. In modern
society, science and technology are considered much more
important than other fields. Modern society could neither
have been established nor exist without the contributions of
science and technology. Modern science has been developing

since the Industrial Revolution in the 16th and 17th centuries.
It has been so accelerated in its rate of development in the
20th century that achievements of science and technology
during the past seven or eight decades have been greater
than those which had been made prior through the whole of
human history.
In Korean history, some original scientific and techno-
logical achievements such as the inventions of a metal painting
type and a rain gauge can be found. But most of the scientific
and technological knowledge being utilized in Korea today was
derived from the Western countries; and also most of this
knowledge and technology came to Korea in the form of finished
products
.
Economic power is the most important force behind any
nation's strength, but it cannot be maintained without the
backup of science and technology. Modern technology is
changing so rapidly that today's new technology will be old
by tomorrow. Without securing a high level of original
technology and the support of science, it is obvious that
one nation might fall behind in international competition.
In the particular case of Korea, rapid expansion of the
GNP and exports have been made, and the level of technology
also has risen through the past several economic development
and implementation plans. But because export of the products
by both light and labor-intensive industry is losing its
superior position and confronting its limitations, competition
with advanced industrial countries is inevitable. This

competition will be in technology through the growth of
brain-intensive industries such as mechanical, metallurgical,
electrical, and electronics industries which need a heavy
industrial base and innovational research and development
[Ref. 3].
Korea has achieved remarkable military progress. From
the army which was equipped with only rifles about 30 years
ago, the Korean military has proudly developed the Air Force,
the Navy, and the Army, the sixth largest ground force in
the world, equipped with modern jet fighters, guided missile
boats, and heavy tanks. Modern technology and sophisticated
weapons are also needed to maintain such modern armed forces.
For a long time after Korea became independent, Free-World
allies provided a large amount of aid to assist her to remain
secure and to achieve self-reliance. The United States spent
$38.3 billion, including $5.7 billion of Economic Assistance
Programs, to maintain Korea's stability from 1946 through
1975, the year most of the grant aids decreased substantially
[Ref. 4]. A Military Assistance Grant Aid of $3.8 billion
is relatively smaller than the $10.8 billion cost of maintain-
ing U.S. military forces in Korea or the $18.0 billion of
estimated Korean War costs to the DOD. Still it was sufficient
to hold back North Korea's attack and it also decreased
Korea's defense burden so as to allocate that amount of
resources to economic development or other sectors . Economic
growth and strong national defense are interrelated and both
require scientific and technological backup.
10

"A hundred and forty years after the Battle of Trafalgar,
the Normandy landings were a triumph of planning, of skill and
improvisation." This was a comment of Dr. Lord Bowden,
Principal, the University of Manchester Institute of Science
and Technology, on the book, The Challenge of War , written
by Guy Hartcup. Dr. Bowden also said, in his foreword to the
book, that it was a pity that Mr. Hartcup had not told us more
about the remarkable feats of the Russian Army [Ref. 5],
G. I. Pokrowsky, General, Engineering Technical Services,
Soviet Army, said in his book, Science and Technology in
Contemporary War, that a nation's ability to conduct wars
depends on that nation's economic productivity. He quoted
Friederich Engels ' words as follows: "Nothing depends more
upon economic conditions than do armies and navies. Arma-
ments, personnel, organization, tactics, and strategy depend,
above all, on the level of production and on the means of
communications achieved at a given time."
Regardless of ideology, it is true that a nation mobilizes
scientific and technological knowledge as much as possible in
order to survive. Needless to say, the effect of the mobili-
zation will be different depending on the strength of the
economy and on the skill in organizing the given resources.
Aids from outside, mainly from the U.S., have diminished
already, and Korea should achieve its self-reliance in defense
as soon as possible. With economic growth, the defense burden
competes for scarce resources. The situation requires a some-
what new policy which is different from that of the Grant Aid
11

era. As the Korean economy should transform its policy from
a labor-intensive structure to brain- intens ive industry, the
defense policy also must be formed with more creative and
productive activities rather than consumption-oriented
performance
.
To repay the taxpayers' investment, the defense authority
must concern itself with multi-dimensional ways including
traditional civic action programs, training technicians and
management, and technology transfer. The multiplier effect
of all of these cannot be estimated but obviously it will be
a great deal and eventually will achieve the nation's security.
"Technology Transfer" is not a term well-known in the
Korean military. But present realities require it more than
ever before.
The Korean military authority has been in a favorable
environment to achieve technological improvement because
Free World allies are willing to help and in-country industries
want to have jobs. Continuous research and development,
proper stock, regeneration, and transfer of internal and
external technology can continue the improvement under such
a favorable environment.
To gain a return on the taxpayers' and allies' investment
in the security of Korea, self-reliance in defense should be
achieved as soon as possible. Self-reliance in defense can
be achieved through technological superiority. And by managing
technology transfer in an appropriate manner, a great deal of




There are two objectives to this paper. The first is
to provide the reader with an appreciation and understanding
of the needs for technology resulting from research and
development regarding Korea's extreme goals: economic growth
and national defense. The second objective is to develop
the reader's understanding of possible efforts and roles of
the military authority to transfer the technology into use
by private and other pbulic sectors.
C. SCOPE
The scope of this thesis develops and encompasses the
following key elements:
1. Problems of Korean economy,
2. Issues of national defense,
3. Need for technological innovations,
4. Need for technology transfer,
5. Nature of technology transfer,
6. Role of Ministry of National Defense in technology
transfer,
7. Need for systematic management of military technology
transfer,
8. Recommendations.
The primary assumption of this thesis is that the Korean
military has never managed technology transfer before. Con-
sequently, this thesis emphasizes the very basic necessity to





Chapter II discusses the problems and issues of the
Korean economy and defense in relation to its growth and
technology environment. It is intended to infer an inter-
dependent relationship between economic growth and national
defense by studying both the historical background and present
problems of the Korean economy. Within the scope of this
chapter, the author discusses the Korean Research and Develo-
ment (RtjD) environment, establishes goals which must be
achieved, and identifies general benefits from technology
transfer
.
Chapter III describes the performance of advanced nations
in technology transfer, studies a theoretical point of view
to prevent a workable plan and methodology for initiating
tasks of technology transfer in the Korean military
establishment
.
Chapter IV evaluates the findings of the previous two
chapters and makes conclusions, emphasizing the need for
systematic management of military technology transfer.
Chapter V presents recommendations.
14

II . PROBLEMS AND ISSUES OF KOREA
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Since Korea was opened to the modern world by the signing
of the Kanghwa Treaty with the Japanese in 1876, there has
been much travail to keep the nation's stability and
peculiarity.
The continuous struggle by foreign countries for supremacy
of the peninsula harrassed internal development until the end
of World War II
.
Economic growth in Korea during the colonial period was
substantial, averaging an annual rate of three percent [Ref. 6"
Industrialization also proceeded rapidly, but the growth and
structural change that took place in Korea during the colonial
period were designed to meet Japanese, not Korean, needs.
To prepare for World War II, the Japanese developed heavy
and chemical industries during the late 1950 's, and most of
them were owned and operated by Japanese with Japanese tech-
nicians dominating key industries [Ref. 7]. Industrialization
and growth were not closely related to the traditional Korean
economy.
Upon liberation from Japanese colonial rule, Korea fell
into economic chaos as well as political struggle. Because
the Japanese Empire chose to complement its economy with no
regard for Korea's self-sufficiency, Korean exports, after
liberation, were thrown into world competition where their
15

former comparative advantage no longer existed. Transferring
from the Yen Bloc to world markets created many serious
problems for Korea which was excessively dependent on a
specialized form of industrial structure that was no longer
appropriate. Such problems were further aggravated by the
country's separation into North and South. Agricultural and
industrial development of the two regions under the Japanese
was highly complementary so that the territorial division
raised questions about the long-run economic viability of each
part of Korea. Thus, partition left South Korea with a
greater population and more productive agricultural land than
the North, but without the most important mineral resources
and the country's power plants. Light industries were mostly
located in the South; heavy and chemical industries in the
North. The two newly created countries had contrasting
structures of production which could have been strongly
complementary [Ref. 8].
Heavy industry which had been producing military goods
was dismantled by American ordnance teams in South Korea
immediately after the war. Also, deterioration of plants
accelerated after the Japanese surrender so that only about
half the factories that had operated in 1944 were estimated
to be operating in 1946, and they were producing at only 201
of capacity [Ref. 9],
Industrial output was also limited by lack of trained
manpower. A 1946 survey of the industrial labor force found
that 40% of laborers had no formal education, and over 50%
16

had attended only primary school. Only one- third of tech-
nicians had gone beyond primary school. Lack of technical
education, as much as lack of supplies and machinery, has
Imade development of an industrial economy in South Korea
difficult [Ref. 10].
For the period of the American Military Government (AMG)
,
1945-1948, 90", of $400 million in economic aid from the United
States to South Korea was in the form of food, fertilizer,
clothing, fuel, and other commodities under the name of GARIOA,
or Government and Relief in Occupied Areas.
The new Republic, established in the southern part of
the country on August 15, 1948, exerted serious efforts to
reconstruct the destroyed economy. Consequently, reconstruc-
tion requirements were reflected in the Korean program of the
Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) for fiscal 1950.
Of the $150 million budget, 80% was to be spent on materials
and replacement items and only 20°s on expansion of capacity
[Ref. 11]. As a result of this economic recovery, in spite
of many problems of political instability, agricultural
recovery and industrial management, agricultural output and
industrial production, which had been abnormally depressed
in 1947 and 1948, rose substantially in 1949. This shifted
American policy away from relief toward longer-term develop-
ment aid. A three-year program costing $350 million, adminis-
tered by the ECA, started with $150 million in fiscal 1950,
$110 million of which was to cover the cost of importing
fertilizer, food, and industrial raw materials. The rest
17

was for a three-stage capital development program aimed at
increasing coal production first, then electrical power
capacity, and finally fertilizer output [Ref. 12].
The favorable trends thus set off in the national
economy as evidenced by a record GNP growth of 9.7% in 1949
were brought to an abrupt and total halt when the Korean War
broke out in June, 1950. With the North Korean invasion,
the South returned to extreme economic disorganization and
social chaos. There were tremendous damages to property as
well as much loss of lives. About 42 to 44% of the pre-war
manufacturing facilities were damaged. Domestic commodity
production sharply declined to half its 1949 level by the
average production index [Ref. 13]. The total damage inflicted
by the three-year war was estimated at $3 billion, and the
annual economic growth of the country suffered a 15.51 setback
in 1950 and a 6% setback in 1951, gaining only \% in 1952
[Ref. 14].
After the Korean War, reconstruction of the infrastructure
and industrial facilities was emphasized, and then policy
emphasis was gradually shifted from reconstruction to price
stabilization. In addition to reconstruction and stabiliza-
tion, considerable proportions of available resources were
allocated to the maintenance of strong military forces to
forestall any new attack from the North [Ref. 15]. During the
post-Korean War period, both the economic and military programs
were largely financed and supported by United States and United
Nations assistance. The Korean government and the U.S. aid
18

mission to Korea (Office of Economic Coordinator) made all
major economic policy decisions through the Combined Economic
Board. The most urgent programs for reconstruction of indus-
trial plants and infrastructures were completed around the
middle of 1957, and the money supply was reduced to about
20% in 1957 from 62% in 1955.
As a result of the concentrated effort to rehabilitate
the war-devastated country, in spite of the heavy burden of
maintaining large armed forces, real GNP grew steadily during
the period 1954-1957.
In contrast to the previous period, economic growth
declined during the period 1958-1960. Social and political
chaos and the gradual reduction of foreign aid were the main
reasons for the decline. And once again, Korean politics,
social and economic disorder swayed the whole of South Korea
by student revolution and military coup.
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The Korean economv has been managed as an integral and
vital part of a garrison state since 1961. Beginning with
the military government, Korean economic policy clearly
shifted from the previous emphasis on reconstruction and
stabilization to a program of growth maximization through
industrialization.
From 1961 to 1976, the government successfully established
First, Second, and Third Five-Year Economic Plans (1962-1966,
1967-1971, 1972-1976), and since 1977, the Fourth Plan is
in progress
.
The First Five-Year Plan (1962-1966) set forth three
major sectors to be developed: to build an industrial base
principally through increased energy production, attainment of
self-sufficiency in food grain production, and development of
industries to supply goods previously imported [Ref. 16].
The gross national product grew at an accelerating rate,
with an average annual increase of about 8%. The population
grew less than had been anticipated so that the GNP per capita
actually increased from $87 (U.S.) to $126 (U.S.) in 1962 to
$250 million (U.S.) in 1966. This export level was nearly
double the goal level.
The most important achievement in economic development
under the first plan was the growth of mining and manufacturing
at an average annual rate of 14.1%. The growth in social
overhead, capital and services was relatively high, 8.31; and
agriculture (including forestry and fisheries) reached only
5.11 in its annual growth rate.
20

The Second Five-Year Plan (1967-1971) was virtually the
same as the first one. But it was essentially a medium- term
plan as the next stage in meeting long-range goals. The
basic objective of the Second Plan was to promote the moderni-
zation of the industrial structure and build the foundations
for a self-supporting economy. Targets for this objective
included attainment of food self-sufficiency, investment in
chemicals, machinery, and iron and steel industries, and a
substantial increase in national income. Special focus of
the targets was on increased farm productivity and income
through diversification of farming. Key strategies for
achieving these targets were rapid export expansion, increased
capital mobilisation, efficient manpower utilization, and
continued financial stability [Ref. 17].
The most important change embodied in the Second Five-
Year Plan was the expansion of the public sector. One possible
reason for expanding the public sector would be to increase
investment in social overhead capital, which generally
requires public outlays for health, education, housing, urban
and regional planning, and the development of science and
technology. Diminishing reliance on foreign saving also
reflects a great change of characteristics of the economy
during the Second Five-Year Plan. Domestic saving rose to
15.61 of GNP after averaging only 7 .4% in the First Five-Year
Plan period [Ref. 18]
.
The Second plan, like the First, surpassed expectations
















































































































































































ANNUAL GROWTH RATE OF MAJOR SECTIONS











1961 4.8 11.9 3.6 - 1.1
1962 3.1 - 5.8 14.1 8.9
1963 8.8 8.1 15.7 7.4
1964 8.6 15.5 6.9 3.0
1965 6.1 - 1.9 18.7 9.9
1966 12.4 10.8 15.6 12.6
1967 7.8 - 5.0 21.6 13.8
1968 12.6 2.4 24.8 15.4
1969 15.0 12.5 19.9 14.6
1970 7.9 - 0.9 18.2 8.9
1971 9.2 3 . 3 16.9 8.9
1972 7.0 1.7 15.0 5.8
1973 16.7 3.6 30.4 14.6
1974 8.7 5.8 17.0 4.9
1975 8.3 7.1 12.9 5.8
1976 15.3 8.5 25.1 11.3
AVERAGE
1962- 66 7.7 5.1 14.1 8.3
1967- 71 10.5 2.3 20.2 12.3
1972- 76 11.0 5.3 19.9 8.4
1962- 76 9.7 4.2 18.1 8.7




recorded an average rate of 10.5% in real terms. Per capita
GNP doubled. Mining and manufacturing increased 20% per
annum; commodity exports advanced from $335 million in 1967
to $1,132 million in 1971.
The Third Five-Year Development Plan can be characterized
by its attempt to promote a "balanced economy" by "expanding
regional development," "developing and improving life in
rural areas," and "improving the quality of the life of
workers" [Ref. 19].
These goals are sufficiently vague but suggest a shift
in emphasis from building an industrial base and modernizing
the industrial structure to rural development and redistribu-
tive programs. Prominently, the Third Five-Year Plan targets
include achievement of self-sufficiency in food grains,
raising of commodity exports to $3.5 billion by 1976, con-
struction of heavy and chemical industries, and promotion of
"balanced regional development" [Ref. 20].
At the end of this plan, the nation achieved an annual
average growth of GNP of 11% in real terms which exceeded
by 2.4% the plan's target. The per capita GNP increased
from $293 in 1972 to $698 in 1976, more than four times the
target amount. The main contributors to rapid growth were
mining-manufacturing which increased an average annual 20%
and exports with an average annual growth of 31%.
The major goals of the Fourth Five-Year Plan (1977-1981)
are, in essence, to achieve a further shift in the economic

































































































































































machinery and electronics; to sustain export growth and
strengthen the balance of payments; and to improve the
distribution of the benefit of growth by maintaining the
growth of employment and broadening the availability of
essential services, including health and sanitation,
housing and electricity.
The targets for these goals are to expand GNP at 9.2%
annually, to increase per capita GNP to $1,512, to increase
mining and manufacturing at 14.2% per annum, the agricultural
sector (including forestry and fishery) at 4%, and social
overhead capital and other services at 7.6%, so as to
account for 40.9%, 18.5% and 40.6%, respectively, of the
GNP in 1981. Commodity exports will increase at 16% and
imports at 12% per annum to provide a positive balance by
1979. Domestic savings are expected to rise rapidly from
8% of the GNP in 1975 to 26.1% in 1981. During the plan
period, 92% of gross investment will be financed by domestic
savings which will constitute 100% of gross investment by
1981.
The thrust of the Fourth Five-Year Economic Plan is to
effect a shift in emphasis from light to heavy industry, and
especially to those skill-intensive heavy industries of
machine -making , shipbuilding and electronics. The aim is to
increase exports while at the same time decreasing imports.
The share of heavy and chemical industries to total manufac-
turing output will increase from 42.4% in 1975 to 49.5% in




























































































































































































































































shipbuilding will increase from 14.8% to 24.2%. Due to its
key role in defense and in the promotion of exports and the
reduction of imports needed to balance the budget, major
emphasis of the Fourth Five-Year Development Plan will be on
the growth and modernization of the machine industry. The
aim for 1981 is to be 70% self-sufficient in machinery as
opposed to 50% in 1975.
Shipbuilding capacity would be expected to grow from
2,600,000 gross tons in 1976 to 4,250,000 gross tons in 1981.
The electronics industry has grown faster than any other
industry in Korea during the past several years and is being
developed as one of the major export industries of the future
It produced $1,400 million worth of goods in 1976, and output
is expected to reach $2,717 million by 1981, $1,700 million
of which will be exported. Steel production is the key to
the development of all other heavy industries. While Korea
invented the world's first iron-clad ship in the 16th century
and the first metal type some 750 years ago, a modern steel
industry did not come into being until the 20th century.
Korean industry was seriously hampered by a lack of iorn and
steel until 1973. As of June 1976, annual production of
steel had risen to 4,600,000 tons, and Korea now ranks among
the top 20 countries in the world in steel production. Among
the other sectors of economic structure, the authomobile
industry, chemical industry, power sources, textiles and con-
sumer goods, agriculture, and fisheries have a readily fore-
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To implement such an ambitious plan, financial and tech-
nological support is needed. The Korean government plans
to provide the overall investment requirement by domestic
savings by 1981. Besides competent planning and proven
ability in economic development, Korea offers a number of
incentives to potential foreign investors. Government policy
is to encourage and protect foreign investments, especially
those which tend to contribute to economic development, an
improved balance of payments position or the introduction
of essential advanced technology [Ref . 21]
.
To solve technological problems, the Korean government
has founded research and education institutes such as the
Korea Institute of Science and Technology (KIST) , the Office
of Atomic Energy (OAE) , the Korea Advanced Institute of
Science (KAIS) , and the Korea Scientific and Technology
Information Center (KSTIC) . These institutes and offices
are working on technological problems related to industrial
development, researching the peaceful use of atomic energy
for industry, medicine and agriculture; providing graduate
education in science and engineering to fill the need for
scientists well trained in technology relevant to the
problems of developing nations and to conduct research of
interest to Korean industries; and collecting and disseminating
information for scientific research and industrial development.
According to the Economic Planning Board (EPB)
,
the
Korean government will increase its spending for research and
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Also a series of plans to develop specific sorts of
industrial technology has been established. This plan
includes activating specialized research institutes: the
Mechanical and Metallurgical Research Institute, the Korea
Institute of Shipbuilding and Oceanography, the Chemical
Research Institute, the Electrical Machinery Research and
Testing Institute, and the Korea Standards Research
Institute
.
B. PROBLEMS OF KOREAN ECONOMY
Laissez- faire may be a major issue of debate in the
Korean economy. It is not a problem related only to Korea.
Today's trend is to prefer a policy of mixed economy. To a
greater or lesser degree, the governments of all nations are
controlling their economies because growth may be affected
or even halted by internal and external political problems.
Korea is one of the countries which have the worst collateral
conditions for economic growth in this sense. Armed con-
frontation with the North has been an ever-present threat
since the Koren War while the potential for an internal up-
rising appears to have grown in recent years. In addition,
the future pattern of development is likely to be influenced
by imbalance which has resulted from rapid growth. Any
meaningful attempt to regain balance is likely to reduce the
future growth rate because greater balance requires compara-
tively inefficient resource allocation. Besides these polit-
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economic growth during the next several decades are likely
to depend upon the international economic situation and the
retention of a comparative advantage in labor-intensive
manufacturers or, possibly, the development of new types
of comparative advantage.
The international economic situation is going to be
unfavorable for growth of the Korean economy. Global
recession, the oil embargo or increase in price, and raw
materials shortages not only restricted Korea's export
expansion but also led to deterioration in terms of trade
and created difficulties in borrowing to cover unusually
large balance-of -payments deficits. The other challenge to
the Korean economy is the trend of the Open-Door Policy of the
People's Republic of China, which may be a great threat to
Korea's staple export commodities produced by labor-intensive
light industries. Chinese labor-intensive commodities,
when grafted to the capital and technology of Japan and
Western countries, have a powerful growth potential. The
reason for this is that economic understanding between China
and Japan or Western countries is coincident. For example,
Japan would like to transfer to China labor-intensive indus-
tries, especially shipbuilding, steel and iron, textile,
fertilizer, electrical appliances, and plywood, which had
led to the high growth rate of the Japanese economy and now
have rapidly declined due to the impact of increases in wages
and yen value. In contrast, those industries which are de-
clining in Japan are industries which China would now like to
36

encourage. This Chinese Open-Door Policy and unfavorable
situations of world economy are factors that stimulate
Korean industries to improve their structure by importing
skill -intensive production methods, an accumulation of
technology, and industrialization of heavy and chemical
products
.
On the other hand, the Korean economy is standing at a
structural transferring point in its internal growth environ-
ment. A structural transferring point means that new driving
forces should be developed because the high rate of growth
creates many drains on the economy of the nation. The require
ments of the people are diversified so that implementation of
a groi^th policy is complicated; consequently, multidimensional
policies and goals must be made congruently.
The Korean economy is now experiencing growth restrictions
characteristic of a mature economy. There are also structural
problems to be solved to overcome the restrictions.
Exports have had advantages in low-wage competition so
far. But such advantages are diminishing gradually as in-
ternal wages are increasing rapidly and externally import
restrictions for labor-intensive commodities are increasing.
Industry's capital accumulation is a problem because so far
Korean industries have accumulated capital by high price
rather than productivity. The industries made profits not
by high productivity which is caused by raising the level of
technology to produce commodities of high quality at low
cost and in great quantity.
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They made profits by paying low wages, cheap interest
rates, reduction of taxes, and by keeping prices high under
a protection policy. But the current situation is likely to
allow no more privileges to those industries.
So the industries should change their production method
to a labor-saving type and restructure their system to capi-
tal and skill-intensive, heavy and chemical industries. But
because this requirement of structural innovation arises so
rapidly, a supply of internal capital and an accumulation of
technology are required. Structural change urgently requires
a supply of capital and the development of advanced technology
and management manpower [Ref. 22].
Capital and technology can be the key to solve other
problems such as price stability, monetary policy, balance-
of -payment, balance development, welfare, and redistribution
as well as structural innovation of industries. In the scope
of this thesis, capital problems are not discussed, and only
technology-related aspects are presented.
The number of scientists and engineers who are associated
with research and development in Korea is 12,800 at present.
This number shows a great difference from the 1,233,000 in
Russia, 526,000 in the U.S., 396,000 in Japan, and 100,000 in
West Germany. This shortage will be understandable when
given as the ratio per 1,000 population. The ratio in Korea
is 0.35, 4.9 in Russia, 2.5 in the U.S., 2.3 in Japan, and
1.8 in West Germany. To increase this ratio to one person
per every 1,000 population, Korea needs about 40,000 scientists
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and engineers by 1991, and about 90,000 of them to increase
the ratio to two. To secure this number of scientists and
engineers, an increase in quantity of four to eight times
will be necessary. It will be very difficult to achieve this
goal without an epochal policy support.
Investment in research and development in Korea was
123 billion won (254 million U.S. dollars) in 1977. This
figures shows a tremendous increase over the 15 billion won
in 1971, and a 76 % increase over the 70 billion won in 1976.
This increase indicates that Korea's interest in science
and technology is rising; however, it is too small an amount
to compare with those of advanced nations.
The U.S. is overwhelming in the amount it invests in
research and development for science and technology; the
figure reached $32 billion in 1974. Russia spent $24 billion
for the same purpose in 1975, Japan $9.3 billion, and West
Germany $7.2 billion.
The GNP ratio of these investments to R$D by each nation
is 4.5% in Russia, 2.3% in West Germany, 2.28% in the U.S.,
2.11 in England, 1.76% in Japan, 1.7% in France, and 0.72% in
Korea.
Fortunately, the Korean government had established a
long-term science and technology development plan which indi-
cated that the proportion of investment to the Science and
Technology plan would be increased at 1.0% of GNP by 1981,
2.0% in 1986, and 2.5% by 1991 [Ref. 23].
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Private enterprises have invested too little to develop
new products or raise the quality of products. Research and
development expenditures of Korean private interprises were
under one percent of their sales revenue. For example,
electronics and electrical industries in Korea spent $4.2
million for research and development in 1977, representing
0.78% of sales revenue.
In the case of Japan and the U.S., Hitachi's research and
development expenditures amount to $207 million, representing
5.4! of its sales revenue. Sony spent 4.5o for the same
purpose, Zenith 3.5%, G.E. 2.5°s, and Hewlett-Packard's research
and development expenditures amounted to $154 million in
1978, which was 91 of its sales revenue [Ref. 24].
Private enterprises now have recognized the lack of
technology and the unfavorable international economic situa-
tion. To catch up technologically, they have greatly enhanced
their basic activities recently. These activities were
initiated by private foundations and universities so that
coordination between industry and science could be attempted
[Ref. 25].
Joint research activities with advanced nations are also
being undertaken in Korea. These joint research efforts are
meaningful in two aspects. The first is that the Korean
scientific society can overcome its backwardness in research
capability and experience. The second is to transfer tech-
nology to the Third World. The reasons that Korea is
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charged with this research are: first, Korea has a relatively
good research capability among the developing countries;
second, resulting technology, if it is adequate for the Korean
environment, can be easily transferred to the Third World.
Technology developed in advanced nations is difficult
to transplant because the research level is so high in
advanced nations that few scientists in those countries have
an interest in appropriate technology for the developing
countries. The attempt to transfer advanced technology to
the developing countries has failed in the past due to
environmental differences and lack of the capacity to receive
it. So the movement to develop and transfer appropriate
technology or intermediate technology, which is suitable
for the environment of developing nations, is coming about.
Through joint research with the National Science
Foundation (NSF, U.S.), the German Research Council (DFG,
Germany), and the German Technology Development Office (GTE,
Germany) , Korea plays a role of stepping stone or gatekeeper




Increasing funds, enhancing internal activities, and
enforcing joint research for science and technology are the
key factors for research and development programs to progress
so that they eventually contribute to the nation's economic
growth.
Dr. Jong-One Choi, Minister of Science and Technology,
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for national economic development and the people's welfare.
This statement encourages people and suggests many policy
changes in science and technology. Some problems are anti-
cipated, however, in implementing plans and programs
success fully
.
The first problem anticipated is lack of personnel who
are or will be associated with research and development at
the present or in the future. The second problem is lack
of technology transfer activities.
About 40% of research personnel in Korea work for
universities while 30% are in industry and another 30% in
research institutes. In contrast, 73% of available research
funds were spent by research institutes in 1977, and only
3% of those funds were allocated to universities.
It is necessary to increase both the number of research
personnel and the amount of research funding to meet the
requirements of the future.
Universities are the only means to prepare qualified
personnel to start research work in society. Universities
must be provided with appropriate funding so as to train
the personnel who can work in the research field in the
future
.
Appropriate allocation of funds among institutes, uni-
versities, and industries will also aid in organizing
scientific personnel.
Without this organization, technology transfer is not to
be expected. Korean industries suffered many problems
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gcaused by lack of technology transfer activities. The Korean
government commissioned the Elison Machinery Production
Technology Support Team to investigate Korean machinery
industries in October 1978. The Elison Project team pointed
out that a considerable portion of the machinery and tech-
nology which Korean machinery industries had imported from
overseas is incomplete or backward. The number of items
of imported technology in Korea is 1,040 as of June 1978.
Expenditures for this technology amounted to $230 million.
This technology imported five items in 1962, 82 in 1972,
109 in 1976, and 170 items in 1977. According to the investi-
gation of the Korean Institute for Science and Technology,
36.5% of this imported technology was backward and had been
developed before 1955; only 14 % of the items were new tech-
nology, developed after 1966. Thirty percent of these
contracts were under condition of export restriction of
products, and almost 80% were contracted in conditions of
re-export restriction of this imported technology. The
consequences of these backward technology imports were bad.
Only 28% of this imported technology could perform at planned
productivity while 36% reached less than 50% of planned
productivity [Ref. 27]. These serious results could be
eliminated or at least reduced by information exchange or
strong government control. Of course, there may be other
reasons for these results, but those other reasons can hardly
exist in the new environment as mentioned previously.
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At this time when funds are increasing, internal activities
are improving, and international joint activities are beginning
for all research and development in science and technology
areas, organizing well for technology transfer is the last
step to be taken to maximize effectiveness for all research
and development effort.
C. THE IMPACT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE ON ECONOMY
The Korean War and the ensuing confrontation with a
hostile power north of the 38th parallel led to restricted
consumption and for the most part distributive issues in
pushing for rapid growth were ignored. However, confronta-
tion has had more direct economic consequences. Korea has
been a garrison state since 1953 with a military establishment
of over 600,000 men and 20 to 251 of the government budget,
or about <\% of the GNP, allocated to defense expenditures
[Ref. 28].
Accordingly, as Korea's economy improves, its fiscal
dependence on others decreases. By 1980, it is estimated that
Korea will be paying more than 951 of its defense bill.
To achieve military self-sufficiency based on strong
economic achievement by 1980 is Korea's defense goal. To
reach this goal, the defense burden and the percentage of
the GNP being funneled into the defense sector of the economy
should almost double -- from 3.5 or 4% to 7.5%. In the event
that assistance or aid from outside actually dries up, the




Economic costs have included a reduction in potential
civilian employment and GNP available for non-military uses
because resources allocated to military ends largely go
for development purposes.
The United States has provided a great deal of military
support and economic assistance to Korea since the Marshall
Plan. The reasons why the Republic of Korea has received
great defense-related foreign exchange earnings can be ex-
plained in terms of its strategic location between China and
Japan, the heritage of the American Military Government era,
the Korean War legacy, and Vietnam War requirements. How-
ever, the apparent danger of attack from the North has
undoubtedly shared responsibility for securing the economic
as well as the military assistance provided by the United
States. For this reason, Korea's costs to maintain an over-
sized military establishment should be reduced by assistance
received to support it and by any possible economic benefits
of military activities.
Confrontation with the North has not only had political
consequences and a direct impact on resource allocation by
diverting more resources to military activities than would
otherwise have been the case, but it has also been used to
justify the sacrifices associated with accelerated growth.
Growth has an additional dimension when it is thought to
contribute to national security. It can be argued that
superior economic performance is needed for protection against
incursions from the North, and also strong defense power is
needed for protection against invasion from the North.
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Besides the direct relationship between economic growth
and national defense to protect each other, some positive
fiscal impacts have resulted from the nation's economic life
from the military establishment. Korea has needed a large
number of managerial and technically oriented personnel to
meet rapidly expanding productivity. Officers and men
discharged from the military service entered both the private
and the public sectors and their managerial and technical
skills, obtained by training in the military, contributed to
building up today's Korean economy. Also, under civic
action programs promoted by the military, men and equipment
were provided to help in building and repairing roads, dams,
schools, and hospitals in the private sector as well as in
local communities. One important factor was the general
policy of using the armed forces and military facilities for
disaster assistance and in large public projects such as
flood control. These activities had an important and usually
beneficial effect on the nation's economic life.
As the structure of the economy changes, many more
instances of cooperation among the different sectors of
economic society will be required. Korean military authority
has to consider the length of time necessary to meet economic
growth and structural change. The defense burden, which was
10.61 in 1961, had fallen to 6.2°s by 1976, with an annual
average for 1961-1976 of 6.9%. The reason for the downward
trend of the Korean defense burden was the country's rela-
tively high growth rate of GNP [Ref. 30].
47

That is, defense expenditures were relatively less be-
cause there was no significant investment to buy or produce
equipment. But this fact should be changed in the not so
distant fugure . Most of the equipment being used now has
been provided by the U.S. in terms of Grant Aid by the
Military Assistance Program (MAP) . When this equipment
becomes obsolete, replacements should be procured by Korea's
own budget. It is clear that the defense budget must be
increased by tremendous amounts to buy such substitutes
either in foreign military sales or in-country products of
defense industries.
Another reason for the anticipated increase in the
defense budget is that research and development expenditures
will be greater in the future. Recently newspapers reported
that Korea has developed a medium-range guided missile and a
small submarine. Still large amounts of effort and funding
will be needed to make technological advances as Korea's
technological level of mass production and performance is
not advanced enough to make such sophisticated modern weapons
at this stage.
Considering that North Korea has still not developed
highly advanced arms while spending 301 of its GNP in the
defense sector every year, it is doubtful that Korea can
allot such a proportion of its GNP to the defense sector and




D. ISSUES OF SELF-RELIANCE IN DEFENSE
Two kinds of problems which are foreseeable for defense-
reliance arise at this stage. One of the problems is to
secure enough funds to achieve self-reliance. The other
problem is how to spend these funds to maximize effectiveness.
Allocation and/or appropriation of national resources
to the defense sector is strictly a matter of national
priority and strategy. So it can be affected by internal
and external trends, the political situation, economic status,
and many other socio-political and socio-economic factors.
It is certain that Korea cannot expect the kind of outside
support it has had during the past several decades. Conse-
quently, the defense burden must be imposed on the people to
the greatest possible extent.
Maximizing the effectiveness of the allocated budget is
absolutely a matter of management and operation. However,
all of the management effort must be consentrated on
utilizing the given defense budget effectively. Self-supply
and self-sufficiency of required qualified arms and materials
must be achieved so as to minimize the people's defense
burden and finally to restrain the enemy.
The trend of the U.S. military assistance to Korea is
toward technological support. The common communique of the
U.S. -R. O.K. defense conference, 1979, said the U.S. will
positively support Korean defense industries except in pro-
ducing nuclear bombs. Korean defense industries now are
producing small arms, cannons, high-speed patrol boats,
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armored personnel carriers, tanks, helicopters, and are
scheduled to produce F-5E fighters by 1981 [Ref. 32].
Such production is initiated by direct or indirect
support of the U.S. in terms of transferring know-how,
affording license, and co-production.
As the structure and status of the economy changes, the
forms and policies of military assistance to Korea from the
outside, particularly from the U.S., changes.
The important thing to be considered is that the attitude
toward receiving assistance should be changed.
The 12th U.S. -R. O.K. Security Conference held in Seoul
in October 1979 suggested that there were certain changes of
attitude concerning Korea on both sides. The conference was
conducted at a higher level than that of previous conferences
which usually discussed what was given and taken mutually.
The results of this conference are: both sides affirmed
once again that Korea is the principal axis for peace and
security in Northeast Asia; the U.S. reconfirmed its benefits
from Korea which has grown as a companion; and Korea gained
actual products for consolidating its base of self-reliance
in defense [Ref. 33]
.
Self-reliance in defense is very difficult to define. It
is more complicated in a situation of collective security. In
a certain sense, self-reliance could be said to be complete
when a nation maintains its own security with its own re-
sources. But the criteria might be changed according to the
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situation because there are too many variables in the real
world.
The amount of resources needed at a given time may
differ according to the threat pressed at that time. And
resources are always scarce. More important in self-
reliance is the nation's will and its ability to mobilize
required resources from others.
The U.S. has changed its policy to treat Korea as a
most favored nation by moving from Group "A" to Group "B"
the properties for foreign military sales. It has agreed to
assemble and produce F-5E fighters in Korea and promised to
raise the level of technology for supporting the Korean
defense industry. This can be understood in the sense of
mobilizing other resources. This means the attitude of
Korea as a recipient has changed. The change has been
brought about by the changed setting of economic growth,
current trends, and military strength. Changing attitudes
created the will and value to achieve self-reliance.
Koreans began to feel more strongly the necessity of
self-reliance in 1969 with the announcement and implementa-
tions of the Nixon Doctrine. Korea assessed the probable
present and future impacts of the doctrine, being mindful of
the restive mood of the U.S. Congress and people at that time
Also Korea examined the traditional model which was based on
the concept of the Cold War. Korea foresaw that its relation
ship with the U.S. would rapidly change and its client status
would soon end. Consequently, Koreans came to the conclusion
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that the only way they could assure their national survival
under such circumstances was to quickly become as self-
sufficient as possible in all vital areas affecting their
national existence. They deemed it desirable to achieve the
capability to travel an independent course without being
critically dependent upon the U.S. for any form of assistance
Jack G. Callaway discussed the conditions of self-
sufficiency as follows [Ref . 34]
:
Economic -- There should be continuous maturation
of the economy that might range between a six and nine
percent GNP growing rate; continuation of high drive
export to GNP ratios; continued expansion of markets;
increased marketability and continued diversification
of products ; continued growth in high technology manu-
facturing; continued diversification and increase of
foreign investors; continued diversification of
reliance on energy sources.
Political -- There should continue to be domestic
political stability. This will require that there be
a most precise assessment of the expectations of the
population and their ability to tolerate frustration in
achieving the more important of these desires. It will
also require careful planning in order to achieve
balance between fulfilling the citizens' expectations
and continuing to call for self-sacrifice in the name
of national security and continued economic growth.
It should be recognized by friends of the Republic that
some forms of criticism of the nature of the ROK
Government can be counterproductive and prejudicial
to the national interest of both countries. It should
also be recognized that American-style democracy is
not always exportable.
Military -- Modernization and improvement of the
ROK armed forces should continue until the situation
has been reached in which the North does not have a
quantitative or qualitative advantage over the South
that might be decisive in the event of war. The
deterrent value of U.S. forces as well as their de-
ployment on the Peninsula should be matched to the
perception of our allies in the area, the ROK and
Japan, and also to those of the PRC and USSR but
most espcially to those of the DPRK.
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The President of Korea and other officials stated when
and to what degree military self-sufficiency would be
achieved. Their statement said that the modernization pro-
gram for Korea's armed forces will be complete in 1980 and
there will no longer be any need for U.S. military presence
or military assistance to repel an attack launched by the
North Koreans which is not supported by either China or the
Soviet Union. Many Koreans and Americans believe that when
this condition has been achieved, a high degree of self-
sufficiency will also have been achieved.
Colonel Callaway sees a fundamental problem in implement-
ing this self-sufficiency plan. It is how to synchronize the
withdrawal of the U.S. military presence so that it does not
destabilize the current equilibrium, while still allowing the
Republic of Korea to move toward self-sufficiency as rapidly'
as possible and free from unnecessary impediments to solid
progress [Ref . 35]
.
When taken one step further, in relation to changing
current trends, arms competition, and the production capa-
bility of the defense industry, it seems not such a simple
problem.
There is no way to know when and how the world situation
will change. The model of the Cold War* has broken. In the
aspect of arms competition with North Korea, the view is
*The model of the Cold War is that the U.S. in on South
Korea's side and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and
the People's Republic of China are on North Korea's side.
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not optimistic. For example, Russia was far behind America
in military technology. But, once Russia committed tre-
mendous effort to the military sector, the quality and
quantity of Russian armed forces threatened America.
Because a communist nation can allocate its resources to
one particular sector, it is very dangerous to try to
compete in one area with a communist nation.
Lack of production capacity in defense industries can be
thought of in two aspects. The first is lack of sources and
lack of capability of the selected source. The second is
surplus of capacity of the selected source.
In the case of surplus, it is caused by too much
specialization for a particular military item. Lack of
sources, or capability of the selected source, is due to the
short history of the defense industry.
Korea must not be satisfied with a level of self-
sufficiency in equilibrium with North Korea's present
strength. Korea must provide for the changeable world
situation in the future.
For these reasons, Korea has to broaden its industrial
base for defense, providing many entities with the opportu-
nity to participate in the defense industry, supporting
capacity surplus entities to look for foreign markets,
supplying advanced technology to general industries as well
as the defense industry.
In short, a principal issue for Korean military self-
sufficiency or self-reliance in defense is to distribute
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opportunity and technology fairly to all entities which will
participate in defense-related programs, and to transfer the
technology outside the military sector so that the Korean




III. MANAGING TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
A. IMPORTANCE OF TECHNOLOGY AND ITS TRANSFER
Economists perceive technology as society's pool of
knowledge regarding the industrial and agricultural arts.
They need advanced technology or technological change to get
the maximum output rate that can be achieved from a given
amount of input. Therefore, they expect technology change
to result in a change in the production function so as to
increase economic welfare through the alteration of production
functions due to technological change [Ref . 36]
.
Scientists understand technology is producing some
physical changes in the world. Therefore, they see a funda-
mental and inherent incompatibility between input and output
in technology [Ref. 37]
.
Strategists emphasize technology to improve the quality
of weapons. They need new and better technology to make
better weapons [Ref. 38].
The importance of technology and its transfer is perceived
differently according to what one wants to get from technology.
Therefore, there is not one universally accepted definition
of technology transfer. But most people who are familiar with
the general meaning would agree that technology transfer is
inherently good. When it occurs there is at least some small
economic, social or other benefit [Ref. 39].
For the purpose of this thesis, the importance of technology
is discussed in the military aspect; therefore, technology
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transfer is considered to be the process which "encompasses
the collection, documentation, and dissemination of scientific
and technical information, including data on the performance
and cost of using the technology; the transformation of research
and technology into processes, products, and services that
can be applied to public or private needs; and the secondary
application of research or technology developed for a particular
mission that fills the needs in another environment" [Ref. 40].
The importance of military technology is well described
in the FY 1980 Department of Defense Budget requests for
research, development and acquisition activities. Dr. Harold
Brown, Secretary of Defense, emphasized that this request
reflected the continuing concern of the U.S. over the signifi-
cant growth in both quality and quantity of Soviet weapons
and technology and established the following three major
objectives
:
- Better justification of programs on the basis of
mission needs to reduce waste and duplication;
- Strengthened technology base;
- Greater cooperation with allies.
He also stated that through exploration of innovative
technology and through improved management of science and
technology resources, it is possible to accelerate the pace
of technology so as to expand available technology options.
This will allow greater selectivity and lower costs in the
more expensive acquisition portion of the total research,
development and acquisition process. He supported increasing
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funds to prevent technological surprise; combining efforts of
the federal, industrial, and university communities to
increase productivity in the production process, a creative,
independent industrial research and development program, and
a high level of innovation within all of these communities;
appropriate management of export controls to prevent a mili-
tary advantage to political adversaries, and an opportunity
for industry to acquire additional resources which can further
be allocated to industrial research and development programs
for the improvement of the national technological position;
cooperative research and development projects with allies to
provide for a stronger and more effective defense by increasing
real growth in the military science and technology programs
and improving the exchange of technological information
between countries [Ref. 41].
The size of Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
(RDT$E) funding was 2 8.35% of the total budget in 1979
and the ratio to procurement funding was 1 to 2.46 (40.651).
The specific gravity of the science and technology program in
RDT§E funding was 19.88% in 1979. The requested budget for
RDT§E funding in 1980 was increased about 101 over that of
1979, and composition of the funds was about the same as the
previous year.
This budget structure shows how much the U.S. military
concentrates its efforts on science and technology programs
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Considering that the U.S. leads in technology around the
world and it needs this amount of funds just to reduce the
possibility of technological surprise, it is easily recognized
that Korea, which is backward in technology and located at a
strategic point where the powerful nations easily collide with
each other, must concentrate its efforts much more on techno-
logical innovation.
It is true that the Korean government strongly desires
military self-reliance and pushes governmental research
agencies and private enterprise to develop a defense industry
rapidly. Even more, Korean government officials hope to
finance the expanding defense bill by exporting Korean-made
arms. Many analysts predict that if Korea develops its
defense industry as rapidly and efficiently as its other
industries, it will soon be offering competition to the U.S.
and European arms manufacturers [Ref. 42].
Therefore, the Korean military needs more advanced tech-
nology and much more funding for research and development.
These needs create complex management problems. Major objec-
tives for the formulation of the U.S. DoD Research, Development
and Acquisition (RD§A) suggest a way of solving the problems.
Advanced technology will be developed from the basis of a
strengthened technology base. The technology base will be
formulated by research and by combined efforts of the federal,
industrial, and university communities. Cooperation with
allies can also be a great help in improving technology.
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Reduction of waste and duplication would contribute to saving
funds while accelerating technological innovation.
It is obvious that all those matters are associated with
transfer of technology. It is time that the Korean military
research and development establishment open the door, which is
closed for reasons of military security, to other public,
industrial, and university communities. This open-door policy
will contribute to the growth of research and development
throughout the country and will promote technology transfer.
The importance of this open-door policy and technology transfer
can be recognized by looking at the Areas of Federal Research
and Development (see Appendix A) and Federal Outlays for
Research and Development (see Appendix B) of the United States .
This policy will accelerate technological change which
will cause multiplier effects on economic growth, with first-
order effects being physical changes in terms of new materials,
designs, and production methods. These modifications induce
social consequences that in turn feed back and alter the
preferences for further innovation through the kinds of new
research that are performed [Ref . 43]
.
American industries gained 17% of all 1971 sales by
selling new products, with the aerospace industry leading all
others by obtaining 49% of its 1971 sales from new items.
Also some communities in Florida and Alabama witnessed more
than 100% growth between 1960 and 1965 in per capita income,





PERCENT OF NEW PRODUCT SALES TO TOTAL
SALES IN THE UNITED STATES IN 1971
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Fabricated Metals and Instruments 24
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The U.S. Government expects universities and colleges
to perform research in all the academic areas. Though the
U. S. Government provides' some support, basic research is
closely associated with institutions granting Ph.D. degrees.
However, the U.S. Government awards large amounts of R§D
funding for academic research to universities and colleges
[Ref. 44].
Also, the U.S. hopes to reduce waste by emphasizing
cooperation with its NATO allies. Thomas A. Callaghan, Jr.
reports NATO's failure as follows [Ref. 45]:
"The past quarter century has witness an incalculable
waste of American and European defense resources -manpower
,
money, materials and structures because the North Atlantic
Alliance has failed to achieve:
- Common military requirements for weapons and equipment
* Thru common tactical doctrine
- Complementary research and development projects
* Thru rationalization of development tasks
* Thru specialization in development areas
- A diversity of weapon system options and hardward
* Thru a U. S
.
/European technology base
* Thru savings in system acquisition and support
practices
- Larger weapons inventories at lower unit cost
* Thru rationalization of production sources




- Mutually supporting general purpose forces
* Thru standardization of weapons and equipment
* Thru common spares and maintenance logistics
- A balanced, collective, conventional force deterrent
* Thru military, technological and industrial inter-
dependence
* Thru marshalling available economic means to achieve
desired military ends
- Equitable financial burden-sharing in all defense areas
* Thru economic and technological benefit-sharing
- Jobs and markets for under-employed defense industries
* Thru non-duplicative projects on an Atlantic
development and production scale
* Thru a North Atlantic common defense market."
Callaghan further asserts that 1001 of European R§D
expenditures, 10 2 of American procurement expenditures plus
252 of European procurement, and 102 of direct American
annual NATO costs plus 152 of European general -purpose forces
expenditures were annual Allied waste.
For reduction of Allied defense budgets, he continued,
NATO industrial rationalization and standardization should be
undertaken and this action would:
- Increase the quality, quantity and diversity of
Allied general purpose forces,
- Enhance the military effectiveness of the Allied
conventional deterrent,
- Create new defense industry jobs on each side of the
Atlantic and ultimately,
- Permit the gradual reduction of defense expenditures,
first in the United States and then later in Europe.
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The realities di '.cussed so far can be perceived as the
benefits or importance of technology transfer. But techno-
logical information is not easily controlled.
B. THE NATURE OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
Technology is distinguished from science not only by the
kinds of people who are attracted to them but also by the
nature of the activities themselves. In science, all of the
work up to any point can be found permanently recorded in
the literature which serves as a repository for all scientific
knowledge
.
In contrast, information is transferred in technology
primarily through personal contact. Publication occupies a
position of less importance than it does in science where
it serves to document the end product and establish priority.
Unlike scientists, the vast majority of technologists are
employed by organizations with a well-defined mission (profit,
national defense, space exploration, population abatement,
and so forth)
. This organizational identification works in
two ways to exclude the technologist from informal communica-
tion channels outside his organization. First, he is inhibited
by the requirements that he work only on problems that are of
interest to his employer and, second, he must refrain from
early disclosure of the results of his research in order to
maintain his employer's advantage over competitors. A good
proportion of the truly important information generated in an
industrial laboratory cannot be published in the open
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literature because it is considered proprietary and must
be protected [Ref . 46]
.
The problem of supplying information to the scientist thus
becomes one of systematically collecting and organizing
scientific outputs and making them accessible to other
scientists to employ in their work. In technology, on the
other hand, there is a fundamental and inherent incompati-
bility between input and output. Outputs can hardly be
utilized as inputs to the next stage because outputs are in
a form basically different from inputs. Sometimes technolo-
gists analyze a competitor's product or weapon systems in
order to gain information. This is a difficult and uncertain
process, however. It would be much simpler if the informa-
tion were directly available in written form [Ref. 47].
There are many variables in the area of technology
transfer. Some of them which can affect the diffusion of
technology are: characteristics related to the innovation;
characteristics of the adaptor; sources of information and
information channels; a number of environmental or contextual
variables. In a general thrust at the problem, incorporating
many of these variables, Harvey Brooks has suggested two
different kinds of technology transfer which he calls verti-
cal and horizontal [Ref. 48]. In vertical transfer, there is
a direct movement from one phase or level to another; the
general is transformed to the specific; basic scientific





































































































































































































































Hoeizontal transfer refers to the adaptation of technology
from one use to another possibly unrelated application: A
firm borrows technology from one field and introduces it into
its own area; a laboratory device is modified to be useful
in industrial practice; technical assistance is utilized in
an underdeveloped country; military/space technology is
diffused into the general commercial market. According to
the characteristics of innovation, both horizontal and vertical




The pattern of technology transfer as described above
indicates the need for a certain degree of organized effort.
Usually research and development laboratories are within the
technology industries. At lower echelons of these facilities,
there are also functional or project organizations which
have specific responsibilities for product or process develop-
ment or cost savings. Figure 4 is a diagram of a typical
pattern of vertical and horizontal transfer of technology.
Within the pattern of technology transfer, there may be
many barriers as mentioned previously. Since technology
transfer has been redefined as "a purposive, conscious effort
to move technical devices, materials, methods, and/or infor-
mation from the point of discovery or development to new
users, the barriers existing between source and user must
be removed" [Ref. 50].
Availability of information is not sufficient for its
transfer or use. There must be both "technology push" and
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"requirement pull" to effect technology transfer [Ref. 51].
Then "technology push" and "requirement pull" should be
matched. If there is no commonality between the two sides,
technology can hardly be transferred. Therefore, considerable
focused effort to actively transfer the particular technology
should occur so as to expedite the transformation of knowledge
into meaningful innovation [Ref. 52].
Conscious and well contrived types of human interactions
can expedite a transfer mechanism. Professor J. W. Creighton
and others first developed a technology transfer process model
in 1972 and explained the concept of a transfer mechanism as
follows [Ref. 53]:
"One method for putting the dynamics of technology
transfer into a usable perspective is to begin discuss-
ing a 'transfer mechanism.' In simplified terms, the
transfer process must include a set of activities
designed to effectively link or couple the source of
the needed knowledge with its eventual user."
A simplified view of the transfer mechanism developed by
Professor Creighton and others is shown in Figure 5. This
transfer mechanism represents the interaction of people and
need not be independent but may be incorporated into either
the supplier or user environment.
This simplified model has been developed further, empha-
sizing the importance of both the potential user's standpoint
and the literature support in this field. Whether it is the
vertical flow of technology, i.e., from a laboratory to a
given application, in a given discipline, or the horizontal































































another, the source signal must be transferred through time
and space which is filled in by certain media. The media or
factors which organize the transfer mechanism have not been
measured as to their effect on the transfer mechanism in a
given organizational situation. These factors are divided into
two parts: formal factors and informal factors. Formal
factors are system oriented and can be easily handled and
operated directly. Informal factors are highly behavioral
and sociological and are quite difficult to handle.
Recently there has been a trend that recognizes technology
transfer as a "people" thing and takes a serious view of
informal factors [Ref . 54] . One report to Congress explains
the importance of informal factors quite well:
"Ther mere availability of information does not cause
its transfer or use. Printed materials alone, even
expertly prepared, cannot stimulate interpersonal
relations, define a problem, answer related questions,
involve consulting authorities, provide follow- through
on problems or relate to other agencies" [Ref. 55].
But there is a necessary step to understanding the tech-
nology transfer process. The formal factors should be
perceived as the first and basic step to transfer technology.
These are procedures for dissemination of storage, indexing
and retrieval of knowledge.
John W. Murdock distinguished technology transfer from
information transfer by its capacity to bring the industrial
processes into action [Ref. 56]. He divided it into three
progressive levels:








































































(2) Information Analysis System (Fig. 8),
(3) Technology Transfer System (Fig. 9).
Figure 9 shows the primary function of scientific
information analysis centers.
The informal factors are perceived as the second
dimension. These are more complicated to manage because
their science base is primarily behavioral rather than
physical [Ref. 57]. For further understanding, the Linker
Model diagram is exhibited and each of its factors is
briefly discussed.
DOCUMENTATION (DOCU) is the format, specifications, and
presentation of the technology or information being trans-
ferred. It can take a variety of forms, but it must be
understandable by the users.
DISTRIBUTION(DIST) is the physical channels used to
distribute the information. It is accomplished by inter-
personal communication, computer assistance, a journal, or
by another vehicle. It is the only factor which will deter-
mine the success of a technology transfer effort.
ORGANIZATION (ORGA) is the impact that the formal organiza-
tion of the potential technology user has upon a transfer
effort. It is a very important factor in which characteristics
of technology transfer can be determined according to the
power structure, the nature of the business, the management
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PROJECT SELECTION(PROJ) is the selection process for
research and development undertaken by the source and receiver's
contributions to that process. The effectiveness of the
utilization of research differs with the entities who initiate
the project.
CAPACITY (CAPA) is the ability and capability of the
potential user to utilize new and/or innovative ideas. It
would be different from individual to individual whose levels
of venturesomeness , wealth, power, education, experience,
age, self-confidence, etc., differ. The capacity should
integrate all the key players' and groups' capacities.
LINKER(LINK) is the individual or group of individuals
who link the source and the application. Linker fills the
roles of leader (gatekeeper or opinion leader) , early adopter
of an innovation (innovator) , and early knower of an
innovation.
CREDIBILITY(CRED) is the receiver's assessment of the
reliability of the information before him. Incredible sources
should be rejected by the potential user.
REWARD(REWA) is a compensation which is given to a new
technology adopter as a consequence of applying technology.
If a man is to be penalized rather than rewarded, he will
most certainly be disinclined to import a new technology idea.
WILLINGNESS(WILL) is the individual's ability and/or
desire to accept change in the organization of which he is a
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Without motivation, a better method, process, or concept
will not be utilized [Ref. 58].
These fairly complex factors are, as mentioned already,
not for just the flow of information but for the conscious
transfer of technology. To guide technology transfer in
the desired direction is important to accelerate the rate
of technology innovation. None of the formal and informal
factors in the technology transfer process can be eliminated
in a technologically backward nation.
C. THE ROLE OF THE KOREAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE IN TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER
The Korean Defense Authority has many responsibilities
in relation to self-sufficiency. These responsibilities can
be roughly divided into internal and external ones. Internal-
ly, the Korean military should be in a high state of combat
readiness to maintain the country's safety. It is an inevit-
able duty, the primary mission of the military. The secondary
responsibility of the Korean military is to participate in
civic actions in order to support local communities. The
reason for this duty is that almost one fifth of the Korean
labor force is in the military. The third responsibility is
to transfer appropriate technology to the civil sector. The
Korean military has had many opportunities to contact
advanced technology by importing new weapons and equipment,
by combined operations with allies, especially with the U.S.,
and by training many personnel abroad. Furthermore, the
military is increasing research and development activities
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as a national priority. This third responsibility is
derived from the necessity to repay the taxpayers.
The external responsibilities are set up, first, to
secure peace for Korea by maintaining the Korean military
at the proper level to guarantee Northeast Asia's stability;
second, to contribute to allies' efforts for collective
security by reducing foreign assistance; third, to develop
appropriate technology to meet Korean needs so as to relieve
allies of the burden of research and development for tech-
nologically backward nations.
Internally and externally, the Korean Military Authority
has responsibility for technological innovation and its
transfer. To fulfill this responsibility, the Korean
Ministry of National Defense must undertake an important
role. That is the role of a catalyst.
As mentioned earlier, the Korean military is in a
favorable position to import advanced technology under any
conditions of payment. This situation will last as long as
the allies, particularly the U.S., want stability in Northeast
Asia. The Korean military is also in a situation to carry
out this role internally. That is because a trend to develop
appropriate or intermediate technology jointly with advanced
nations exists in the Korean research and development field,
and industries which rush to change their structure need new
technology and jobs.
The Korean military can affect almost all Korean
industries in regard to small domestic markets and poor
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progress of research and development activities among the
industries
.
From this point of view, the Korean Military Authority,
Ministry of National Defense, can act the role of a catalyst
in the technology transfer process. A catalyst can act
more powerfully than a simple linker. A linker simply
connects or couples one presence to another. A catalyst
not only couples two subjects together but also changes the
characteristics of those two subjects. In other words, the
Korean Military Authority should stand at the middle of a
vertical transfer of technology rather than of a horizontal
flow. Reality requires a three-dimensional role for the
Korean military. Receiving, innovating, and transferring
the appropriate technology are equally important. The
three should be simultaneous and parallel.
In this sense, the Korean Military Authority is a
receiver and supplier of the technology at the same time.
As a receiver, the Korean Military Authority seems to have
little problem in the informal factors. They are so eager
to import or receive advanced technology that Willingness,
Reward, and Credibility factors of the Expansion Model of
Technology Transfer are sure to be solved. Informal linkers
will also come into being because the Korean military has
used foreign arms, mostly U.S. arms, for a long time. There
is not much of a problem with Capacity except in highly
precise equipment and nuclear weapon production.
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There are major problems in formal factors. The fact is
that the Korean Military Authority is not functioning at all
in the Selection Process for Projects. There are no organized
selective acquisition activities, no storage and retrieval
facilities nor offices, and also no organized dissemination
function. The Formal Organization factor presents much to
• be discussed, however. Jack G. Callaway stated that the
Korean military is a highly professional, highly disciplined
and motivated force [Ref . 59] . The general feeling of the
author about this factor is that there is a lack of delega-
tion of authority and most decisions are made by authoritarian
management
.
Considering the supplier side, there is a basic problem
to be solved. There are no Documentation Activities, no
Distribution System at all. As stated previously the
Korean military is ignorant of technology transfer discipline.
Observing industrial firms from the position of informa-
tion supplier, the Korean Military Authority is confronted
with two kinds of problems. The first is that a firm has
Capacity but has no Willingness. The second is vice versa.
The first case exists among big enterprises which can exploit
the foreign market. They do not want to shift existing pro-
duction lines or facilities to new production lines or
facilities for a small domestic market. For the same reason,
they do not want to invest in a new production facility.
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the firms are receiving technology information under the
condition which requires them to make military articles.
The general spirit of the Korean enterprises for making
profits explains this situation fairly well; however, a
typical case is the trend of the Sang Sung Group, one of the
biggest enterprises in Korea [Ref. 60].
The second case is happening among small businesses. They
have no capacity in terms of technology and capital. But they
seriously want jobs. The Korean Military Authority has to
analyze the status of firms in order to find adequate users.
Thus it plays a linker role on the supplier side.
D. STRUCTURING THE ORGANIZATION TO MANAGE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
Now the Korean Military Authority has to do something to
solve the problem mentioned above. It is considered urgent
as long as military self-sufficiency has top priority as a
national goal.
The Linker Model developed in the U.S. by Professor
Creighton and others could be modified to meet Korean needs.
By adding formal linkers in the supplying organization among
the formal factors, the Korean Military Authority can accel-
erate transfer of technology and control its process.
Figure 13 shows the modified model of technology
transfer.
There must be an agency which can suggest military
technological information to be reflected as the national
stretegy or policy. There are agencies which are associated
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with the defense industry in the Korean military establishment.
One of them is the Agency of Defense Development (ADD)
,
a laboratory for research and development in all areas re-
lated to defense except tactics and doctrine. The Research
and Development Bureau of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
controls ADD by providing funds and assigning research
tasks. There is no capability or function to process techno-
logical information in this bureau.
The Defense Industry Bureau in the Ministry of National
Defense deals with contract administration, negotiation, and
financing for acquisition. It is not a technology-related
office
.
Obviously it is necessary to activate an office or agency
similar to the scientific and Technological Information
Analysis Center (Figure 9). The primary mission of the
agency is to link the sources and potential users of the
technological information. The secondary mission is to
analyze the status of the objective enterprise firm so as
to find potential users. The functions of this agency would
be collection, selection and storage of information, producing
new information through retrieval processes, suggesting the
potential users, and dissemination through appropriate channels
According to the characteristics of these functions, this
agency should be at a higher level in the hierarchy of the
defense establishment so that the agency can directly contact




The infrastructure of this agency would be composed of
specialists in each field of science and technology, military
specialists, business management specialists, and computer
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IV. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
Korea, one of the countries most recently opened to the
modern world, has grown as a new developing nation in terms
of economic and military strength.
Through ambitious plans and strong implementation, Korea
has achieved a high rate of economic growth during the past
two decades. But there are many problems to be solved in
order to continue steady growth. The most important and
principal problem is lack of a technological base.
As history has shown, Korea has had its trials and survived
among the big powers around the Korean Peninsula. Liberation
and the consequences divided this highly complementary industri-
al structure in two, the North and the South. The Korean War
was a turn for the worse. Social, political and economical
chaos continued until the military coup in 1961. Colonial
rule and foreign aid did not leave a technological inheritance.
The Korean military has gone through the same growth path
as the economy. The armed forces, which are maintained with
foreign assistance, lack the capability for self-reliance.
For both the economy and national defense, advanced
technology is essential for self-reliance. The economy and
national defense have responsibilities to support each other.
The economy has the responsibility to finance the military




To fulfill its responsibility, the Korean military must
utilize its advantageous position. The Korean military has
another responsibility to its allies who have helped to
assure Korea's security. To achieve a high level of self-
sufficiency in defense is necessary for the Korean military.
To do so, technological innovation is required. And techno-
logical innovation can be accelerated by proper technology
transfer processes.
Unfortunately, there are no appropriate activities for
technology transfer in the Korean military establishment. As
the term "technology transfer" means, there must be considerable
activity to accelerate and guide the flow of technology in
the intended direction. For this reason, the Korean Military
Authority, the Ministry of National Defense, should establish
and activate an office or agency which will take the role of
Linker (in one sense, a catalyst) in the technology transfer
process
.
The primary mission of the agency would be to link the
source and potential user of the technological information.
And the secondary mission would be to analyze the status of
the objective enterprise firm so as to find potential users.
The functions of this agency would be collection, selec-
tion and storage of information, producing new information
through retrieval processes, suggesting the potential user,
and dissemination.
The agency must be positioned at a higher level in the





According to the conclusions, it is recommended to
establish and activate an agency, tentatively named the
Scientific and Technological Information Analysis Center,
directly under the Vice Minister of National Defense.
The primary mission of the agency is to link the sources
and potential users of the technological information. The
secondary mission is to analyze the status of the objective
enterprise firm so as to find potential users.
The functions of this agency are to collect, select and
store the information, retrieve and produce new information,
suggest the potential users, and disseminate information.
To perform these missions and functions, this agency will
be composed of specialists in each field of science, technology,





Federal Outlays for Research and Development, by Agency,
Fiscal Year 1977
(estimated, millions of dollars)
[Ref. 58, pp. 67, 68]
Agency and Subdivision Outlay
Total, All Agencies ---------------- 23,595.9
Departments
Department of Agriculture, Total- --------- 518.6
Agricultural Research Service --------- 282.9
Cooperative State Research Service- ------ 123.8
Economic Research Service ----------- 25.0
Farmer Cooperative Service- ---------- 1.5
Forest Service- ---------------- 83.6
National Agricultural Library --------- *
Statistical Reporting Service --------- 2.0
Department of Commerce, Total- ---------- 230.1
Bureau of the Census- ------------- 1.5
Economic Development Administration ------ 11.9
Maritime Administration ------------ 19.2
National Bureau of Standards- --------- 50.4
National Fire Prevention and Control
Administration- --------------- 4.2
National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration- --------------- 159.6
Office of Minotiry Business Enterprise- - - - - 1.9
Office of Telecommunications- --------- 1.2
Patent and Trademark Office ---------- .4
Department of Defense, Total- ----------- 10,969.0
Department of the Army- ------------- 2,405.7
Military Functions- -------------- 2,390.6
RDT$E Appropriations- ----------- 2,287.0
Pay and Allowance of Military Personnel
in R§D- ----------------- 92.1
Military Construction ---- - 11.5
Civil Functions ---------------- 15.0
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Department of the Navy- ------------ 4,118.5
RDT§E Appropriations- ------------ 4,007.0
Pay and Allowances of Military
Personnel in R§D- ------------- 97.0
Military Construction ------------ 11.4
Special Foreign Currency Program- ------ 3.1
Department of the Air Force ---------- 3,740.3
RDT$E Appropriations- ------------ 3,448.0
Pay and Allowances of Military
Personnel in R$D- ------------- 240.1
Military Construction ------------ 52.2
Defense Agencies- --------------- 677.2
RDT§E Appropriations- ------------ 669.8
Pay and Allowances of Military
Personnel in R§D- ------------- 7.3
Military Construction ------------ .2
Department-wide Funds ------------- 1.0
Director of Test and Evaluation, Defense- - - - 26.5
Department of Health, Education and Welfare,
Total ------- --------- 2,558.6
Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental
Health Administration ----------- 129.4
Center for Disease Control- --------- 40.1
Food and Drug Administration- -------- 50.0
Health Resources Administration ------- 29.9
Health Services Administration- ------- 14.9
National Institute of Education ------- 88.0
National Institute of Health- -------- 2,010.0
Office of Education ------------- 77.7
Office of Human Development --------- 63.4
Office of the Assistant Secretary
of Education- ------ - 11.1
Office of the Secretary ----------- 29.6
Social and Rehabilitation Service ------ 9.2
Social Security Administration- ------- 25.2
Department of Housing and Urban Development - - - 73.8
Department of the Interior, Total - _ - 308.1
Bonneville Power Administration ------- 4.7
Bureau of Land Management ---------- 1.0
Bureau of Mines --------------- 129.1
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Bureau of Outdoor Recreation- --------- *
Bureau of Reclamation ------------- 8.2
Geological Survey --------------- 114.8
National Park Service ------------- 9.6
Office of the Secretary ------------ 1.5
Office of Water Research and Technology - - - - 18.2
United States Fish and Wildlife Service - - - - 21.0
Department of Justice, Total- ----------- 42.9
Bureau of Prisons --------------- 1.8
Drug Enforcement Administration -------- 5.6
Federal Bureau of Investigation -------- .6
Immigration and Naturalization Service- - - - - .4
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration - - - 36.6
Department of Labor, Total- ------------ 34.2
Bureau of Labor Statistics- ---------- 1.7
Employment and Training Administration- - - - - 15.8
Employment Standards Administration ------ 5.5
Labor-Management Services Administration- - - - 2.8
Occupation Safety and Health Administration - - 6.3
Office of the Secretary ------------ 2.2
Department of State, Total- ------------ 26.6
Departmental Funds- -------------- 1.5
Agency for International Development- ----- 25.0
Department of Transportation, Total -------- 547.5
Federal Aviation Administration -------- 109.9
Federal Highway Administration- -------- 42.8
Federal Railroad Administration -------- 41.8
National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration- --------------- 40.8
Office of the Secretary ------------ 29.1
United States Coast Guard ----------- 18.5
Urban Mass Transportation Administration- - - - 64.6
Department of the Treasury, Total --------- 1.6
Bureau of Engraving and Printing- ------- 1.6
Other Agencies
Action- ---------------------- *
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations -------------------- 1.4
Civil Aeronautics Board -------------- .5
Civil Service Commission- ------------- 3.9
Community Services Administration - - - - 39.0
97

Consumer Product Safety Commission- -------- 6.4
Energy Research and Development Administration- - - 3,479.5
Environmental Protection Agency ---------- 503.0
Federal Communications Commission --------- 1.6
Federal Energy Administration ----------- 5.6
Federal Home Loan Bank Board- ----------- .8
Federal Trade Commission- ------------- 1.3
Federal Services Administration ---------- 2.8
Library of Congress ---------------- 3.4
National Aeronautics and Space Administration - - - 5,676.0
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ----------- 106.5
Office of Telecommunications Policy -------- 2.7
Small Business Administration ----------- .6
Smithsonian Institution -------------- 51.6
Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention - -
Tennessee Valley Authority- ------------ 51.0
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency - 2.5
United States Information Agency- --------- .1
Veterans Administration -------------- 105.2





AREAS OF FEDERAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
[Ref. 59, pp. 1055-44]
AERONAUTICS
Aerodynamics: Operational flight characteristics and
problems of fullscale aircraft as they are affected by the
dynamics of air.
Aeronautics: Aircraft operations such as takeoff and
landing, air traffic, all-weather and night flight, flight
safety, and ground safety.
Aircraft: Design, production, and maintenance of aircraft,
aircraft components, and aircraft equipment. Includes lighter-
than-air craft, gliders, rotating-wing aircraft, and ground
effect machines. Structural studies of complete aircraft
parts such as airframes, bodies, wings, etc. Stability and
control systems, boundary layer control systems, dynamic and
static control devices. Aircraft damage assessment and
vulnerability studies; effects of gunfire and blast on air-
craft and flight equipment.
Aircraft Flight Instrumentation: Instruments necessary
for controlling the flight of an aircraft. Includes arti-
ficial horizon, airspeed indicator, altimeter, etc.
Air Facilities: Airports, runways, hangars, control
towers, ground refueling systems, aircraft handling and
maintenance equipment.
AGRICULTURE
Agricultural Chemistry: The application of chemistry
to the production and use of crops and livestock; chemurgy,
fertilizers, feeds.
Agricultural Economics: Economic conditions, markets,
production controls, subsidies, etc. affecting agriculture.
Agricultural Engineering: Design of farm machinery and
farm structures. Soil conservation, water consdrvation, and
irrigation. Processing of farm products.
Agronomy and Horticulture: Field crop production,




Animal Husbandry: Production and care of domestic animals,
such as bovines, sheep, goats, horses, and swine; domestic
animals used as pets. Includes veterinary medicine.




Astronomy: Observation of celestial bodies, their
distances, positions, etc.
Astrophysics: Physical and chemical aspects of celestial
bodies, their origin and evolution. Includes astronomical
spectroscopy and radio astronomy.
Celestial Mechanics: The motions of celestial bodies
under the influence of gravity.
ATMOSPHERIC SCIENCES
Atmospheric Physics: Physical and chemical properties
of the atmosphere, exclusive of considerations of weather
and climate, Aeronomy, aurora and airglow, atmospheric
structure, energetic particles, solar- terrestrial relationships,
etc.
Meteorology: Weather observation, prediction, and modifi-
cation, climatology.
BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
Administration and Management: Accounting, planning,
budgeting, operations, public relations, production planning,
organization coordination, etc.
Documentation and Information Technology: Library science:
acquisition, cataloging, indexing, abstracting, bibliography.
Information storage and retrieval systems.
Economics: Econometrics, economic history, economic
theory, banking and finance, international economic relations,
trade and commerce.
History, Law, and Political Science: Theory and practice
of government, international relations, politics, law, etc.
Human Factors Engineering: Design of equipment with
emphasis on optimum utilization by humans. Habitability of
work and living space.
Humanities: Philosophy, literature, art, music, drama, etc.
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Linguistics: Study of languages, including phonology,
morphology, syntax, and semantics. Mathematical linguistics.
Machine translation.
Man-Machine Relations: Interaction of man and equipment
in terms of subsystem and system performance requirements and
evaluation. Encompasses manual controls, information displays.
Information processing, tactical kinethesis and other human
sensory modalities involved in operation of equipment and
understanding of personnel subsystems.
Personnel Selection, Training, and Evaluation: Recruit-
ment, selection, training, and utilization of personnel.
Industrial relations, wages, benefits. Education, teaching
aids, teaching methods. Job analysis, career guidance.
Psychology (Individual and Group Behavior) : Mental
processes and phenomena such as perception, learning moti-
vation, intelligence, attitudes, group dynamics, etc.
Experimental psychology, including animal behavior; physio-
logical psychology; developmental psychology; social psychology;
clinical psychology; educational psychology; military psychol-
ogy; and parapsychology.
Sociology: Social relations, the functioning of human
society, ethnology, criminology, etc.
BIOLOGICAL AND MEDICAL SCIENCES
Biochemistry: Studies of the chemical processes which
take place in biological systems. Identification of bio-
chemical substances and the methods used for biochemical assay
and analysis
.
Bioengineering : Establishment of requirements for, and
development of, bioins trumentation and equipment needed by
man in operation of man-machine systems. Includes instrumenta-
tion for psychophysiological monitoring and biomedical informa-
tion handling. Compact, lightweight transducers and transmitter
equipment introducing minimum constraint of subject. Man's
requirements for displays and controls. Use of body poten-
tials as intrinsic power supplies.
Biology: Biological topics not included in other Groups,
e.g., botany, zoology, genetics, etc. Animal anatomy,
physiology, and pathology. Care and breeding of laboratory
animals
.
Bionics: Study of biological processes in order to
develop engineering systems.
Clinical Medicine: General medicine, medical specialties,
and paramedical sciences. Internal medicine, including
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preventative medicine; pediatrics and geriatrics; dermatology,
ophthalmology; psychiatry; dentistry. Includes nursing,
first aid, medical technology, physical therapy, and prosthesis
Environmental Biology: External influences on the
biological processes of organism. Ecology, pesticides,
insect vectors, pest control, natural noxious agents, etc.
Escape, Rescue, and Survival: Methods and equipment for
escape from disabled aircraft, submarines, etc. Rescue
equipment, signals, flotation devices, survival kits.
Food: Processing, packing, storage, preparation, and
dispensing of food. Kitchen equipment.
Hygiene and Sanitation: Personal hygiene
Industrial (Occupation) Medicine: Interaction of man and
industrial environment. Noise, physical trauma, etc.
Life Support: Equipment and techniques for sustaining
life in environments where normal respiration is not possible.
Systems which provide, as a mininum, respiratory support.
Includes closed ecological systems, space suits, diving
gear, oxygen masks, etc.
Medical and Hospital Equipment and Supplies: Equipment
and supplies for laboratory and field use.
Microbiology: Studies of microscopic plants and animals.
Personnel Selection and Maintenance (Medical) : Physical
standards, examinations, anthropometrics, physical fitness.
Pharmacology: The synthesis, composition, properties,
and physiological effects of drugs. Includes psychopharma-
cology
.
Physiology: Organic processes and pehnomena of humans,
e.g., growth, aging, metabolism, biological rhythm, healing
and repair, sensation, etc. Human anatomy.
Protective Equipment: Equipment providing protection
against such environmental elements as heat, cold, noise,
machinery, etc.
Radiobiology : Radiation biology. Interaction of biologi-
cal systems with electromagnetic and particle radiation.
Dosimetry, health physics, radiation injury. Prophylaxis and
therapy of nuclear radiation sickness and injury.
Stress Physiology: Effects of extreme environments or
unusual stimulation on biological processes. Physiological
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effects of motion, gravity, sound, light, heat, magnetism,
sensory deprivation, fatigue, etc.
Toxicology: Detection, neutralization, decontamination,
physiological effecte, etc. of poisonous substances.
Weapon Effects: Wounds, injuries, or other medical
conditions directly resulting from weapons.
CHEMISTRY
Chemical Engineering: Techniques, processes, unit opera-
tions, apparatus, and plant equipment that apply to chemical
manufacturing, processing, transportation, and storage.
Inorganic Chemistry: Synthesis, properties, and reactions
of inorganic compounds; studies of the elements; inorganic
quantitative and qualitative analysis.
Organic Chemistry: Synthesis, properties, and reactions
of organic compounds; organic quantitative and qualitative
analysis.
Physical Chemistry: Physical aspects and theoretical
interpretations of chemical systems. Collois chemistry,
catalysis, solutions, chemical equilibria and reaction
kinetics, surface chemistry, chemical thermodynamics and
thermochemistry, etc. Physical methods of analysis not
applied exclusively to either organic or inorganic chemical
substances. Atomic and molecular structure and spectra;
spectroscopic analysis for the fundamental understanding of
chemical bonding, nuclear motions, etc. Nuclear magnetic
resonance spectroscopy and electron paramagnetic resonance
spectroscopy
.
Radio and Radiation Chemistry: Chemistry of the effects
of electromagnetic and particle radiation on matter.
Chemistry of radioactive substances. Tracer studies.
Includes photochemistry.
EARTH SCIENCES AND OCEANOGRAPHY
Biological Oceanography: Marine plant and animal life
as it relates to its environment.
Cartography: Mapping, photogrammetry , terrain models, etc
Dynamic Oceanography: Ocean waves, currents, tides,
ocean-air interactions, etc.
Geochemistry: Chemical composition of the earth's crust.
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Geodesy: Geodetic surveying. Determination of position
of points on the earth's surface. Shape and size of the
earth. Variations of terrestrial gravity.
Geography: Description of the physical features of the
earth, the distribution of plants and animals. Includes
political, economic, and commercial geography.
Geology and Mineralogy: Structure, properties, and
classification of rocks, rock formations, and rock constitu-
ents. Mineraolgy, paleontology, stratigraphy.
Hydrology and Limnology: Properties, distribution, and
circulation of water, including its surface and underground
occurrence. Physical, chemical, and biological conditions
in fresh water bodies
.
Mining and Engineering: Location and evaluation of mineral
deposits. Layout and equipment of mines. Mining operations.
Physical Oceanography: Physical and chemical properties
of ocean water. Topography and composition of the ocean
bottom.
Seismology: Detection, measurement, and recording of
seismic phenomena.
Snow, Ice, and Permafrost: Physical characteristics of
snow, ice and permanently frozen soil.
Soil Mechanics: Physical properties and engineering
aspects of soils.
Terrestrial Magnetism: Geomagnetic variations, field
theory, magnetic moments, etc.
ELECTRONICS AND ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING
Components: Design and development of basic electrical
and electronic components such as electron tubes, semiconductor
devices, switches, connectors, etc.
Computers: Design, development, and application of
electronic computers and peripheral equipment. Includes
analog, digital analog-digital, special purpose, and general
purpose computers; computer accessories, supplies and installa-
tion; computer software such as programs, programming
languages, program generators, compilers, executive routines,
and system evaluation.
Electronic and Electrical Engineering: Electronic systems,
except those included in Navigation, Communications,
Detection, and Counter-measures. Electrical systems.
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Information Theory: Representation, uncertainty, noise,
information content, information entropy, coding theory.
Subsystems: Electrical and electronic devices which are
composed of components, but which require other such devices
to form complete systems. Includes amplifiers, antennas, etc.
Telemetry: Techniques and equipment, including trans-
mitters, receivers, antennas, etc.
ENERGY CONVERSION (NON- PROPULSIVE)
Conversion Techniques: Techniques and devices for the
conversion of one form of energy to a form of non-electrical
energy, but which do not primarily involve energy storage.
Power Sources: Devices which supply electric power by
energy conversion processes which do not primarily involve
energy storage. Includes generators, converters, fuel cells,
etc
.
Energy Storage: Techniques and devices for the storage
and subsequent use of energy. Includes electrical batteries
and battery components.
MATERIALS
Adhesives and Seals: Adhesives, glues, binders, etc. for
all types of materials. Sealants, seals, and gaskets.
Ceramics, Refractories, and Glasses: Ceramic materials,
including glasses, brick, porcelain, tiles, etc. Non-
metallic refractory materials. Cements.
Coatings, Colorants, and Finishes: Paints, paint primers,
varnishes. Plastic, rubber, ceramic, and metal coatings.
Uses of dyes and pigments.
Composite Materials. Materials composed of two or more
physically distinct constituents.
Fibers and Textiles: Natural and synthetic fibers,
threads, yarns, and textiles.
Metallurgy and Metallography: Refining and production of
metals and alloys. Microstructure
,
physical and mechanical
properties, corrosion studies, etc. Heat-resistant metals
and alloys. Includes extractive and physical metallurgy.
Miscellaneous Materials: Materials not included in another
Group, including leather, fur, and other animal products.
Refrigerants, straw, waxes, etc.
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Oils, Lubricants, and Hydraulic Fluids: Properties,
performance, and production of all types of oils, lubricants,
and hydraulic fluids.
Plastics: Properties, performance, and production of
all types of plastics and resins, including reinforced
plastics and laminates.
Rubbers: Production, performance, and properties of
natural and synthetic rubber and rubber products. Elastomers.
Solvents, Cleaners and Abrasives: Cleaning compositions,
solvents, detergents, soaps, abrasives, etc.
Wood and Paper Products: Wood, wood products, paper,
cardboard, etc.
MATHEMATICAL SCIENCES
Mathematics and Statistics: Mathematics and statistics
research
.
Operations Research: Theoretical operations research.
MECHANICAL, INDUSTRIAL, CIVIL, AND MARINE ENGINEERING
Air Conditioning, Heating, Lighting, and Ventilating:
Air conditioning systems, refrigeration systems, cold storage
systems. Heating systems, heat pumps, boilers, furnaces,
radiators, condensers. Lighting systems.
Civil Engineering: Water supply systems: well drilling,
water collection, storage, treatment, distribution. Sanitary
engineering: waste and sewage disposal, air and water pollu-
tion control. Flood control. Highway and traffic engineering.
Urban planning and renewal.
Construction Equipment, Materials and Supplies: Excava-
tion and earth moving equipment, hoisting and conveying
equipment, construction equipment. Building materials and
supplies
Containers and Packaging: Design, production, performance,
and testing of containers. Packaging methods. Storage tanks
and accessories.
Couplings, Fasteners, and Joints: Design, performance,
and testing of bolts, screws, studs, rivets, hooks, couplings,
and fittings. Bonded, soldered, and welded joints, etc.
Ground Transportation Equipment: Design, operation,
performance, and maintenance of amphibious vehicles, cargo




Hydraulic and Pneumatic Equipment: Design, production,
performance, and testing of hydraulic and pneumatic systems.
Accumulators, distribution equipment, actuators, controls,
and components
.
Industrial Processes: Production control, quality control,
plant design, inspection. Fabrication, cleaning and finishing,
etc. of industrial materials. Includes fabrication metallurgy:
casting, forging, drawing, eledtroforming , extrusion, machining,
rolling, stamping, spinning, welding.
Machinery and Tools: Machines and machine elements,
including bearings, clutches, drives, gears, cam, springs, etc.
Metalworking tools, woodworking tools, dies, jigs, etc.
Marine Engineering: Design, construction, maintenance,
salvage, operation, and performance of all types of ships,
boats, and marine equipment.
Submarine Engineering: Design, construction, maintenance,
salvage, operation, and performance of submarines and sub-
marine equipment
.
Pumps, Filters, Pipes, Tubing and Valves: Design,
construction, operation and performance of all types of
pumps, filters, pipes and pipe fittings and valves.
Safety Engineering: Accident prevention, safety
devices, f ire - fighting equipment, fire-detection equipment.
Structural Engineering: Design and construction of
structures such as buildings, bridges, dams, etc.
METHODS AND EQUIPMENT
Cost Effectiveness : Examination and selection of equip-
ment, materials, personnel, etc. for optimum performance of
given tasks. Cost-benefit analysis, tradeoff factors, etc.
Laboratories, Test Facilities, and Test Equipment:
Laboratory and test facility design and operation. Measuring,
testing, and simulation devices with apparent application in
more than one group.
Recording Devices: Techniques and devices for electrical
recording. Includes disk, magnetic, electrostatic, etc.
Reliability: Determination of the probability of
satisfactory performance of components and equipment.
Prevention and correction of malfunctions.
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Reprography: Photographic techniques, equipment, and




Antisubmarine Warfare: Operations conducted against
submarines
.
Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Warfare: Develop-
ment and utilization of lethal and non-lethal chemical
agents, biological agents, and radiological weapons. Detec-
tion, decontamination, protective equipment, etc. CBR
ordnance items, such as bombs, projectiles, and rockets.
Defense: Active and passive systems for military and
civil defense. Antiaircraft and antisatellite defense systems
Antimissile Defense: Techniques and equipment for the
interception and desctuction of guided missiles.
Intelligence: Techniques for collecting, evaluating,
and disseminating information concerning foreign nations
needed for purposes of national security.
Logistics: Procurement, storage, distribution, and
reclamation of equipment and supplies. Design and testing
of personal equipment, such as clothing, field gear, etc.
Transportation. Industrial mobilization.
Nuclear Warfare: Development and utilization of nuclear
weapons. Studies of the physics and physiological effects
of nuclear weapons
.
Operations, Stretegy, and Tactics: Joint and combined
operations. Campaigns, battles, invasions, theater opera-
tions, etc. Methods of attack and support. Types of warfare.
MISSILE TECHNOLOGY
Missile Launching and Ground Support: Missile handling
and launching, including transportation; storage; preparation
for launching; surface, aircraft, or underwater launching.
Launching equipment, checkout equipment, and ground support
equipment
.
Missile Trajectories: Determination, analysis, and
processing of missile trajectory data. Flight path analysis,




Missile Warheads anf Fuzes: Design and performance of
all warhead types, including explosive, chemical, biological,
and nuclear missile fuzes of all types.
Missiles: General missile theory, design, construction,
performance and components. Damage assessment and vulnera-
bility studies.
Air- and Space-Launched Missiles: Theory, design,
construction, performance, and components. Damage assessment
and vulnerability studies.
Surface-Launched Missiles: Theory, design, construction,
performance, and components. Damage assessment and vulnera-
bility studies.
Underwater-Launched Missiles: Theory, design, construc-
tion, performance, and components. Damage assessment and
vulnerability studies.
NAVIGATION, COMMUNICATIONS, DETECTION AND COUNTER-
MEASURES
Acoustic Detection: Detection by means of acoustic
waves, including ultrasonic and infrasonic radiation.
Communications: Communications by wire or electromagnetic
waves other than radio waves.
Radio Communications: Communications by radio waves.
Direction Finding: Determination of the direction of
arrival of signals.
Electromagnetic and Acoustic Countermeasures : Interception,
jamming and antijamming, and deception of acoustic and
electromagnetic signals.
Infrared and Ultraviolet Detection: Detection by measure-
ment of infrared and ultraviolet radiation.
Magnetic Detection: Detection by measurement of a
magnetic field.
Navigation and Guidance: Techniques for navigation and
guidance. Includes air traffic control systems, controlled-
approach systems, and instrument landing systems.
Optical Detection: Detection by means of light. Includes
such optical instruments as binoculars and periscopes.
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Radar Detection: Detection by means of transmitted and
reflected radiofrequency waves.
Seismic Detection: Detection by measurement of seismic
waves
.
NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Fusion Devices (Thermonuclear): Theory, design, construc-
tion, and operation of devices for producing controlled
thermonuclear fusion reactions.
Isotopes: Separation or concentration of isotopes.
Industrial and medical applications.
Nuclear Explosions: Explosion effects such as shock
waves and earth movement. Testing of nuclear devices.
Peaceful applications, such as Plowshare.
Nuclear Instrumentation: Radiation detection devices
and associated equipment
.
Nuclear Power Plants: Integrated assemblage, including
reactor and turbogenerator equipment, plus control and
regulatory devices. Includes mobile as well as stationary
power plants.
Radiation Shielding and Protection: Shielding design,
isodose plots, materials transmission and absorption studies,
safety devices, decontamination, etc.
Radioactive Wastes and Fission Products: Separation,
processing, handling, storage, and disposal. Fission product
utilization.
Radioactivity: Radioactive decay, natural and induced
radioactivity, interaction of charged particles and radiation
with a-tter, radioactive fallout.
Reactor Engineering and Operations: Engineering related
directly to the design or operation of a specific reactor
or reactor type.
Reactor Materials: Production, testing, or reclamation
of fuel materials, coolants, moderators, control materials,
structural materials, and shielding materials. Includes
fabricated elements or assemblies and specific configurations,
Reactor Physics: Reactor kinetics, reactor theory,
criticality and neutron thermalization, scattering, slowing





Reactors (Power): Design, construction, operation,
etc., of reactors used as energy sources for electric power
generation
.
Reactors (Non-Power) : Reactors designed and built for
purposes other than for electric power or propulsion.
Includes production research and training, test, and process
heat types.
SNAP Technology: Systems for Nuclear Auxiliary Power,
both isotopic and reactor.
ORDNANCE
Ammunition, Explosives, and Pyrotechnics: Projectiles,
fuzes, demolition explosives, detonators, grenades, land
mines, high explosives, primers, powder propellants, ammuni-
tion shaped charges, flame throwers, ammunition handling
equipment, etc. Production, performance, stability in
storage, etc. of incendiaries, pyrotechnics, screening agents
and smokes , etc.
Bombs: High-explosive, fragmentation, anti -personnel
,
armor-piercing, general-purpose, etc. Bomb handling equipment.
Combat Vehicles: Armored wheeled and track-laying vehicles
for both cargo and personnel. Heavy, light, and medium tanks.
Tank chassis used as gun carriers, their components and
accessories
.
Explosions, Ballistics, and Armor: Explosion effects
such as blast, heat, earth movement, etc. Ballistics.
Armor plate, body armor, etc.
Fire Control and Bombing Systems: Computers, sights,
directors, range finders, gun-laying and bombing radar systems,
bomb releases and other devices used to direct the firing of
a weapon.
Guns: Small arms, automatic weapons, recoilless weapons,
mortars, artillery and naval guns, their components, accessories,
and interior ballistics. Gun carriages, gun mounts, remote
control equipment, etc.
Rockets: Rocket-propelled weapons, including aircraft,
large caliber, and shoulder-fired rockets. Launching devices.
Underwater Ordnance: Torpedoes, submarine mines, depth






Acoustics: Generation and propagation of acoustic waves,
including ultrasonic and infrasonic radiation.
Crystallography: Structure and properties of crystalline
forms
.
Electricity and Magnetism: Theory of electrical and
magnetic phenomena.
Fluid Mechanics: Theoretical and experimental studies
of the dynamics and statics of fluids, including aero-
dynamics and hydrodynamics
.
Masers and Lasers: Devices which amplify electromagnetic
waves by stimulated emission of radiation. Includes irasers,
uvasers, etc.
Optics : Generation and propagation of electromagnetic
waves in infrared, visible, and ultraviolet regions of the
spectrum. Techniques and design of optical equipment for
mass spectroscopy.
Particle Accelerators: Design and operation of betatrons,
cyclotrons, synchrotrons, etc.
Particle Physics: Properties and reactions of elementary
particles. Nuclear reactions. Gamma rays, x-rays.
Plasma Physics: Properties of actions of plasmas,
including magnetohydrodynamics
,
pinch effect, plasma oscilla-
tions, plasma jets, etc.
Quantum Theory: Relativistic and nonrelativis tic quantum
theory, relativity theory, quantum mechanics and quantum
statistics
.
Solid Mechanics: Dynamics and statics of solid bodies.
Structural mechanics, kinetics, kinematics, equilibria,
stress analysis, buckling, elasticity, plasticity, vibrations,
shock and vibtation, etc.
Solid State Physics: Structure and properties of solids.
Properties of solids at cryogenic temperatures. Includes
fundamental research and theoretical studies of semiconductors
Thermodynamics: Thermodynamic theory; equations of
state, free energy, enthalpy, entropy, thermodynamic cycles,
etc. Heat transfer, including methods for determining thermal
radiation properties of materials. Low- temperature phenomena.
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Wave propagation: Propagation of radiofrequency waves.
Includes microwave optics.
PROPULSION AND FUELS
Air Breathing Engines: Advanced engines which use
ingested air to oxidize their fuel, e.g., the liquid air
cycle engine (LACE)
.
Combustion and Ignition: Combustion and flame studies.
Ignition and ignition systems.
Electric Propulsion: All types of engines deriving power
from free ions or electrons. Ion, plasma, and arc-jet
engines
.
Fuels: Production, performance, storage, etc. of all
types of fuels except those used in rocket engines.
Jet and Gas Turbine Engines: All types of jet and gas
turbine engines, including hydroduct, turboprop, etc.
Nuclear Propulsion: Nuclear devices for marine, ground,
air, and space propulsion.
Reciprocating Engines: Reciprocating Engines of various
configurations for all types of propulsion.
Rocket Motors and Engines: General studies of rocket
motors and propulsion hardware. Gaseous, thixotropic, and
hybrid rocket motors.
Liquid Rocket Motors: Studies of liquid rocket motors
and propulsion hardware.
Solid Rocket Propellants : Production, handling, per-
formance, etc. of all-solid rocket propellants, including
fuels, oxidizers, additives, binders, etc.
SPACE TECHNOLOGY
Astronautics: Orbital rendezvous, space exploration,
operations in space, spacecraft operating problems, etc.
Spacecraft: Design and construction of spacecraft,
including satellites, space probes, space capsules, space-
ships, space stations, aerospace planes, and their com-
ponents. Spacecraft damage assessment and vulnerability
studies
Spacecraft Trajectories and Reentry: Determination,
analysis, processing, etc. of spacecraft trajectory data.
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Orbital calculations, flight path analysis, reentry, space
mechanics , etc
.
Spacecraft Launch Vehicles and Ground Support: Handling
and launching, including transportation, storage, prepara-
tion for launching, and countdown. Launching equipment,
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